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Abstract—Control logic programs play a critical role in in-
dustrial control systems. A vulnerable control logic could lead
to devastating consequences in the physical processes, as shown
in Stuxnet and similar attacks. Over the years, academic and
industrial researchers have investigated various fault injection
and modification attacks on control logic as well as formal
verification-based defenses. Although formal verification tech-
niques have in general improved the quality of control logic
programs, we find a significant gap between the academic
research and the industry practices in defending against attacks
on control logic. Besides, the future research directions remain
unclear as to protect control logic from the ever-expanding
attack surface partly caused by the increasing needs for inter-
connectivity.
This work fills the gap by systematizing the knowledge of
control logic modification attacks and the formal verification-
based defenses. Our study covers the full chain of developing
and deploying control logic programs, from engineering stations
to target PLC. The primary goals of the systematization are (1)
to explore the evolving technology and security landscape sur-
rounding control logic programs, (2) to investigate newly emerged
attack surfaces on PLC systems and the formal verification-
based defenses, and (3) to identify the open challenges and needs
that existing formal verification based-defenses failed to address.
Based on the knowledge systematization, we provide a set of
recommendations for both academic researchers and industry
practitioners to better focus their work on countering critical
and emerging threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) are subject to attacks sabo-
taging the physical processes, as shown in Stuxnet [65], Havex
[85], TRITON [64], Black Energy [35], and the German Steel
Mill [101]. These attacks cause severe financial losses and
devastating consequences to multiple industrial sectors, such
as water treatment, chemical processing, and nuclear plants.
Control logic modification attacks are among the most critical
thanks to their ability to subvert the entire infrastructure
controlled by the victim systems. For example, the well-
known Stuxnet [65] attack damaged one-fifth of Iran’s nuclear
centrifuges.
As a principled approach to detect flaws in programs, formal
verification on control logic was first presented nearly thirty
years ago [117].Some recent work [54], [55] has shown that
control logic is amenable to formal verification thanks to
the graph-based programming languages and the small pro-
gram size. Formal verification provides rigorous mathematical
proofs at different levels of abstractions.
However, with recent advances in Industrial Internet of
Things (IIoT) and expanding attack landscape, existing formal
verification techniques become insufficient for countering ex-
isting attacks. Control logic can interact with multiple compo-
nents e.g., engineering software (integrated development envi-
ronment), supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA),
human-machine interface (HMI) and online services (web).
Attacks targeting control logic modification can happen in
different stages: during development, transmission, or execu-
tion. Formal verification faces challenges in (1) countering
the complex industrial networking, with proprietary network
protocols [38], [97], [102], [131], (2) overcoming the real-time
constraints with limited resources on the programmable logic
controller (PLC) [143], and (3) efficiently define explicit and
complete properties to avoid evasive defenses [111].
This work aims to systematically investigate control logic
modification attacks and formal methods based defenses. We
first define the scope of control logic attacks and investigate the
existing techniques used in such attacks. To identify the current
trends of in recent attacks, we collect related vulnerabilities
from two widely used vulnerability databases [19], [20]. The
results show extensive possibilities for control logic modifi-
cation attacks, which inject malicious payload in commands
or organization blocks. We found that there has been an
exponential increase in the number of related vulnerabilities
in recent years. Complex networking and infrastructure, high
diversity in vendors and program versions, and emerging
technical trends (e.g., cloud-based control) all contributed to
the increase.
Second, we investigate the state-of-the-art formal
verification-based defenses. Surveying the related papers
published in the last thirty years, we found that applying
formal verification to control logic has made great progress
[142], including automatic formalization of complete control
logic languages defined in IEC-61131 [39], and hybrid models
that support transition from a continuous part to a discrete part
of a system [92]. It is also encouraging to see prototypes of
joint formal verification for both PLC and SCADA [114], and
user-friendly verification with simulation and visualization.
Nevertheless, we discovered multiple security challenges for
formal verification based defenses, including synchronization,
multitask, and etc.
As a call for solutions to address these challenges, we
provide a set of recommendations for vendors, control logic
programmers, and security researchers. We recommend PLC
vendors to prioritize security with standardized design, so
that formal verification can be more targeted and effective.
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We recommend users, including control logic developers and
operators, and formal verification experts, to adopt existing
best practice formal verification techniques, at programming,
transmission, and runtime. We recommend security researchers
to further investigate formal verification with mixed languages,
explicit properties, multitask, and synchronization. We sug-
gestion extension to firmware, runtime, and input protection,
through collaborating with other technologies.
A. Systematization Methodology
1) Scope of the paper: This paper focuses on system-
atization of control logic modification attacks, and formal
verification based defenses to ensure control logic integrity.
Specifically, we consider the following aspects while perform-
ing the systematization.
• Stage: This refers to when a control logic attack/defense
happens, such as the programming/development stage,
the transmitting stage (from an engineering software to a
PLC), or the execution stage.
• Assumption: This refers to the threat model of an at-
tack/defense, the underlying weaknesses of a reported
vulnerability, and other dependencies to perform the
attack/defense.
• Approach: This refers to the concepts, techniques, tools,
and strategies being used in an attack/defense.
• Industrial sector: This refers to the domain where a
control logic program is designed for or used.
• Open challenges: These are the unresolved challenges
associated with detecting control logic modification at-
tacks, awaiting future research to address.
2) Paper selection criteria: The literature is selected based
on the following criteria. The work (1) investigates control
logic modification attacks or formal verification based de-
fenses, (2) is impactful considering its number of citations,
or (3) discovers a new direction for future investigation.
B. Contributions
• Systematization of control logic modification attacks and
formal verification-based defenses in the last thirty years.
• A framework to collect, filter, and analyze control logic
modification vulnerabilities from two notable databases.
• Bridging the gap between industrial and research efforts,
with a set of recommendations on the best practices
of using formal verification to mitigate control logic
modification attacks.
• Pointing out future research directions.
II. BACKGROUND
This section first defines control logic, then introduces its
background, and finally describes its attack surface and formal
verification based protection.
A. Control Logic
We define control logic as a program that is executed in a
PLC and controls a process taking inputs from sensors and
sending outputs to actuators. Control logic code is usually
code transmission
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Fig. 1: The interacting components of control Logic.
programmed in a remote engineering software, after that is
transmitted to a PLC, and finally executes in a PLC. During
the runtime, control logic repeatedly executes a three-step scan
cycle. First, the input scan takes a snapshot of the input and
saves it in a data table. Then, the logic execution feeds the
input to the control logic and executes its instructions. Finally,
the output scan produces the output based on the execution
result.
1) Programming languages: Control logic can be pro-
grammed in five languages defined by IEC-61131 [132]: func-
tion block diagram (FBD), ladder diagram (LD), structured
text (ST), sequential function chart (SFC), and instruction list
(IL). FBD and LD are diagram-based languages. Some high-
end PLCs also support computer-compatible languages (e.g.,
C, BASIC, and assembly), special high-level languages (e.g.,
Siemens GRAPH5 [28]), and boolean logic languages [108].
Manufacturers may choose different schemes for I/O address-
ing, memory organization, and instruction sets, making it hard
for the same code to be compatible across vendors, or even
models within the same vendor. This poses challenges for
control logic protection.
2) Interacting components: Due to the advances in modern
PLCs, control logic can interact with a set of software and
services, as Figure 1 shows. For example, engineering software
or IDE in a general-purpose computer, e.g. Allen Bradley
RSLogix [24], Mitsubishi GX Developer [17], designs and
programs the control logic. An HMI, e.g. Rockwell RSView32
[25], provides a user-friendly interface allowing a process
personnel to interact with the control logic running in the
PLCs . A SCADA [23] supervises the PLC through analyzing
the the state of input, outputs and internal variables of the
control logic. 1. Recent advance in cloud computing and IIoT
allows control logic to communicate through the Internet, with
Web, SQL, Email, or Message Queueing Telemetry Transport
(MQTT), and interconnect in a Distributed Control System
(DCS).
B. Control Logic Security
Control logic suffers from numerous types of attacks, e.g.
denial-of-service attacks, spoofing attacks, and modification
attacks [118]. To defend against these attacks, industrial and
research efforts have presented and standardized a set of
security solutions, such as authorization and access control,
1The definition of these components are getting blurry, for example, a PLC
may have an HMI embedded as a bundle, and a broader definition of SCADA
considers HMI as part of its components.
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securing communication (e.g. SSL/TLS, HTTPS, and VPN),
and Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and forensic analysis,
as used in most IT industries [59], [118], [137]. This work
focuses on control logic modification attacks and formal veri-
fication based protection, since a large volume of works have
been done over the years, while (un)satisfied requirements are
still unclear between the industry and the academy [54], [59].
1) Control logic modification attacks: We define such at-
tacks as modifications that can cause control logic to output
abnormal and potentially unsafe commands. The modifications
can come from injections and manipulations at the stages of
source code programming, code transmission, and runtime.
In particular, runtime modification can result from the input
sensors [110], communication and synchronization between
control logic and an interacting component [143], and the PLC
memory [129].
2) Formal verification: Formal verification is a method
proves or disproves if a program/algorithm meets its speci-
fications or desired properties based on certain form of logic
[15]. The specification may contain security requirements and
safety requirements. Commonly used mathematical models to
do formal verification include finite state machines, labeled
transition systems, vector addition systems, Petri nets, timed
automata, hybrid automata, process algebra, and formal se-
mantics of programming languages, e.g. operational seman-
tics, denotational semantics, axiomatic semantics, and Hoare
logic. In general, there are two types of formalization: model
checking and theorem proving [83]. Model checking uses
temporal logic to describe specifications, and efficient search
methods to check whether the specifications hold for a given
system. Theorem proving describes the system with a series of
logical formulae. It proves the formulae imply the property via
deduction with inference rules provided by the logical system.
It usually requires more background knowledge and nontrivial
manual efforts.
Existing works concentrate on formal verification at the
control logic programming stage. For example, the European
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) uses PLCverif, a
formal verification tool to check critical control logic programs
[59].
III. SYSTEMATIZATION OF ATTACKS
In this section, we systematize control logic modification
attacks from industrial and research efforts. We aim to identify
the context of changing technology and threat landscape. We
then call out the open challenges and shine light on the
improvement of security mechanisms.
A. Industrial Efforts
Industrial efforts are represented by reported Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures (CVE)s. We first extract the CVEs
to understand the attack methods, underlying weaknesses, and
their impact on different industrial sectors. We then identify
the general trends of control logic modification attacks.
The information of control logic vulnerabilities come from
several sources: the ICS-CERT [19], the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [20], and the Exploit Database [21] created
by Offensive Security. We developed an analysis framework
to automatically crawl and extract useful information, such as
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)s, the impacted ven-
dors and industrial sectors, and the complexity of the CVEs.
With this framework, we extracted useful information and
generated reports 2 from year 2008 (i.e. the first control logic
related vulnerability was reported) to the end of year 2019.
The detailed description of the databases and the framework
is listed in the Appendix.
1) Stage: Some vulnerabilities aims at modifying control
logic source code, by exploiting the engineering software [4].
Some vulnerabilities leverage Ethernet design flaw and use a
specially crafted packet to delete control logic programs [7],
[13]. Other vulnerabilities modify control logic at runtime,
leveraging firmware and authentication flaws, and triggering
PLC fault states to overwrite the control logic [10], [29]. Most
of the vulnerabilities leverage the runtime communication
of control logic with the other components, using specially
crafted packets, or commands to achieve remote code modifi-
cation [5], [6], [9].
2) Assumptions: The collected control logic vulnerabilities
assume some triggering conditions and weaknesses of the
programs. To trigger a vulnerability, an attacker will either
need direct access to the PLC, or the communication link
between a PLC and a supervisory software.
The weaknesses are represented by CWEs, as shows in Fig-
ure 7. Half of the CWEs are not novel, such as Improper Re-
striction of Operations CWE-119, Cross-site Scripting CWE-
79, Improper Input Validation CWE-20, in which CWE-119
has the most vulnerabilities associated with nearly 50 records
in total. These CWEs are reported almost every year in the
last ten years. The other half CWEs are only reported in the
last few years, e.g. Stack-based Buffer Overflow CWE-121,
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption CWE-400.
Furthermore, some of the CWEs are specifically common to
control logic vulnerabilities, e.g. Stack-based Buffer Overflow
CWE-121, Uncontrolled Search Path Element CWE-427, Im-
proper Access Control CWE-284. The rest of the CWEs align
with the general top 25 CWEs [1] reported.
3) Approaches: Industrial security practitioners have found
various types of vulnerabilities in performing control logic
modification attacks. Representative examples 3 of control
logic vulnerabilities are as follows:
a) Engineering software: CVE-2010-5305 [4] allows an
unauthorized user to program and configure the control logic
programs in a series of Rockwell controllers. The vulnerability
is caused by a potential for exposure of the product’s password
used to restrict unauthorized access to Rockwell controllers.
b) Ethernet: CVE-2017-12088 [7] leverages a specially
crafted packet, with certain bytes in the crash section, to send
to a Micrologix controller over the default port. This causes
2The databases have some missing points. We only report available ones.
3Some vulnerabilities are from a PC, but can potentially modify control
logic, according to the ICS advisory.
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the PLC to enter a fault state, and clear the existing control
logic.
c) Stealthy attacks: CVE-2019-10929 [13] allows an
attacker in a Man-in-the-Middle position to modify network
traffic exchanged on port 102/tcp to SIMATIC controllers.
This is caused by certain properties in the calculation used
for integrity protection. If control logic programs are commu-
nicating through this port, it is possible to stealthily change
the code without being notified.
d) PLC authentication: Some vulnerabilities are due to
unauthenticated users having read and/or write permissions
on numerous files within the PLC. With these permissions,
it is possible to change control logic, insert invalid values, or
trigger device faults [29]. CVE-2017-14463 allows an attacker
to trigger a fault state to overwrite the control logic data
file with null values. CVE-2017-14465 allows an attacker to
force any PLC input or output, causing unpredictable activity
of the control logic. CVE-2017-14467 allows an attacker to
edit rungs online, including addition, deletion, or modification
of existing control logic. Additionally, faults and cpu state
modification can be triggered if specific control logic is used.
e) PLC firmware: Firmware is usually considered secure
because of authentication at boot-time and runtime integrity
check. CVE-2017-14468 allows to trigger the PLC to load
programs from EEPROM on error. A larger exploit can
leverage this ability to flash custom firmware [10]. This is
possible because firmware updates are either often publicly
available online or can be dumped from memory using cold
boot attack [30]. With some off-the-shelf reverse engineering
tools, attackers can customize malicious payload and disguise
their attacks.
f) OPC standard: CVE-2011-3330 [5] leverages buffer
overflow in the device driver of the Open Platform Communi-
cations (OPC) Factory Server, to execute arbitrary code via an
unspecified system parameter. OPC Factory Server provides
real time access to Schneider Electric automation controllers
and SCADA connected to Ethernet networks or fieldbuses.
g) SCADA: CVE-2011-5163 [6] leverages buffer over-
flow in an unspecified third-party component in the batch
module of SCADA, and allows local users to execute arbitrary
code via a long string in a login sequence. Ironically, we
also found multiple vulnerabilities in a SCADA based security
manager [18], which has high privilege to access important
services and files.
h) Web services: CVE-2017-12739 [8] allows unauthen-
ticated remote attackers to leverage an integrated web server
(used for diagnostics purpose) to execute arbitrary code on
the affected device. This vulnerability leverages code injection
CWE-94. Our study further reveals that around 20% of the
reported control logic vulnerabilities are from web services,
such as replay attacks via http traffic, injection of arbitrary
web script or html via unspecified vectors. Web services may
have internet connection, making the control logic vulnerable
to worldwide attacks.
i) HMI: CVE-2017-13997 [9] allows an HMI client,
e.g. InduSoft Web Studio, to trigger script execution on the
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Fig. 2: The relationship between reported common weaknesses
and the affected industrial sectors. The notation number de-
notes the number of CVEs reported.
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Fig. 3: Yearly reported control logic related CVEs.
server to perform customized calculations or actions. A remote
malicious entity could bypass the server authentication and
trigger the execution of an arbitrary command.
j) DCS: CVE-2019-10922 allows an attacker with DCS
access to execute arbitrary code, due to due to devices con-
figured without encrypted communication [12]. CVE-2019-
10918 allows an attacker with low-privileged user account
access to the dcom interface, to leverage a crafted packet to
execute arbitrary commands with system privileges [27].
4) Industrial sectors: We found some CWEs almost equally
impact different industrial sectors, as shows in Figure 2.
These weaknesses are Cross-site Scripting CWE-79, Hard-
code Credentials CWE-798, Improper Authentication CWE-
287, and Unrestricted Upload Dangerous Type File CWE-434.
On the other hand, we found some weaknesses are specif-
ically targeting the top three industrial sectors, including
Stack-based Buffer Overflow CWE-121 and Improper Input
Validation CWE-20. We hypothesize that these industrial sec-
tors, e.g. manufacturing, energy, and waste water system, are
more motivated to embrace new technologies with complex
networking and diverse vendors. A closer look at the CVEs
caused by CWE-121 corroborates this, showing the sources
of vulnerabilities from InduSoft Web Studio for HMI and
SCADA, Proficy Historian, Micrologix Ethernet functional-
ity, programmable controller communication commands, etc.
Ironically, one of them is LAquis SCADA Smart Security
Manager, which brings vulnerabilities as side products of
protection.
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5) Open challenges: The reported vulnerabilities pose open
challenges to security mechanisms.
a) The exponential increase in the number of reported
vulnerabilities: Figure 3 shows the number of control logic
related CVEs on a yearly basis. In total, there are 588
different CVEs published. Before 2010, few vulnerabilities
were reported each year. Starting from 2011 (e.g. the year
after Stuxnet), the number of vulnerabilities increased almost
exponentially, apart from a minor drop from 2013 to 2015.
In 2018, the number of reported CVEs was more than 175,
reaching the maximum of the past years. This demonstrates
that, before 2010, control logic related vulnerabilities have
long been overlooked. Given the current trend, it remains chal-
lenging to effectively reduce the number of new vulnerabilities
in the next few years.
b) Expanded attack surfaces from runtime communica-
tion: The evolved design of control logic makes it inevitable to
communicate with expanded attack surfaces. The vulnerabili-
ties can come from the design flaws within (1) the PLCs, (2)
the supervisory components, (3) the embedded services and
functionalities, such as profile monitors, security managers,
databases, etc [18], and (4) internet or cloud-based hosting and
management [8], [11]. It remains an open problem to eliminate
the design flaws within these factors.
c) The increased diversity in implementations: The di-
versity can come from vendors, product versions, and third-
parties. For example, there are vendor-specific HMI products,
such as InduSoft Web Studio, Advantech WebAccess, Wecon
LeviStudioU, and etc. There are third-party implementations
of OPC services, such as OPC DataHub. The diversity was
brought by the differences in the requirements from hardware
and software producers. However, the diversity amplifies the
impact of single vulnerability, since one vulnerability can
affect multiple vendors and product versions [5], [9]. The di-
versity also increases the possibility to find new vulnerabilities,
due to similar design flaws. It remains challenging to balance
the impact of vulnerabilities, and the requirements of diversity.
d) Insufficient adoption of formal verification: We found
that half of the weaknesses are not novel—some CWEs are
reported almost every year, as figure 7 shows. A lot of the
vulnerabilities are due to bad coding examples, such as no
authentication, string length check, or unused variables. Such
mistakes can be easily prevented by formal verification of
the control logic code. We believe current adoption of formal
verification is insufficient in the industry.
B. Research Efforts
The research efforts are represented by existing papers
presenting control logic modification attacks. To reflect the
context of changing technology, these papers are categorized
based on the methods to reach the control logic, and the
approaches to hide malicious behaviors from detection, as
Table I shows.
1) Stage: Existing works focus on modifying control logic
during communication [38], [71], [91], [97], [102], [131] and
runtime [32], [79], [109]–[111], [130].
TABLE I: Control logic modification research.
Detection to evade StageRuntime Transmission
Implicit
specification
McLaughlin’11
CaFDI N/A
Engineering
operations
LLB
Senthivel’18
HARVEY
Lim’17
CLIK
CLIK
Other
detections
Abbasi’16
Xiao’16 Yoo’19
None
SABOT
PLCInject
PLC-Blaster
Beresford’11
PLC-Blaster
ICSREF
*Note: Some attacks happen in more than one stages.
2) Assumptions: To perform control logic modification
attacks, existing works assume three types of threat models:
(1) attackers can directly modify control logic programs in a
PLC [109], [111], [130], or (2) attackers can compromise the
SCADA network, or engineering station, connected to a PLC
and modify the control logic programs [38], [71], [91], [97],
[131], or (3) attackers can compromise the input of the PLCs,
e.g. sensor measurement, and use a crafted value to deceive
the control logic to behave maliciously [32], [79], [110].
Further, some works assume the attackers to have internal
knowledge of the ICS, e.g. PLC vendors, software versions,
facility layout, etc [109], [110]. As to the impact of the attacks,
some works aim at maximizing damages to the physical plant
with straightforward attacks [38], [97], [131], e.g. upload
random instructions. Other works attempt to be stealthy to
bypass detection through searching implicit security properties
of the control logic [111], or the engineering operators [102].
3) Approaches: Since the discovery of Stuxnet attacks in
2010 [65], increasing attention has been paid to control logic
modification attacks. Initially, researchers held the assumption
that automated attacks on control logic are not practical with-
out having a prior knowledge of the target physical process.
a) 2011-2013: McLaughlin [111] eliminated this as-
sumption by proposing a prototype attack that can automati-
cally obtain clues about the process structure and operations.
They assumed they have access to the PLCs and can read the
code and data memory, to find clues including the process
fieldbus IDs of devices in the plant, and the safety interlocks
that prevent the process from entering unsafe states. They
propose to leverage existing work [68] to find implicit safety
properties that can cause unsafe behaviors without alarming
the systems, and then generate malicious payloads based
on the findings. This attack was designed to target railway
interlocking system. On a different setting, Beresford pre-
sented similar attacks on control logic using Siemens Simatic
S7 [38]. Since the control logic and the engineering station
communicate using ISO-TSAP packets in plain text, attackers
can intercept and reverse engineer these packets. Attackers can
retrieve information such as tag names, data block names, and
PLC names. Attackers can also rewrite logic to the controllers
based on needs, e.g. replace one tag with the other, use the
5
tag as the identifier for further payload injection. Beresford
further pointed out that Simatic PLCs (IPC line) run x86
Linux, and an inserted payload can create shells with root
permissions, at the time of writing. These attacks have the
potential to cause critical damages to the physical processes.
However, the chance for a successful mapping between the
variables and the devices through memory probing is small.
Even though a mapping is available, attackers have to further
craft the malicious payload to satisfy the implicit properties,
making it hard to guarantee an effective and stealthy attack.
To make these attacks more adaptive and scalable, SABOT
was implemented in 2012 [109]. SABOT requires some high
level descriptions of the physical plant, e.g. “the plant contains
two ingredient valves and one drain valve“. Such information
can be acquired from public channels, and are similar for
processes in the same industrial sector. With this information,
a behavioral specification can be generated for plant devices,
and a list of temporal logic properties can be defined. SABOT
assumes access to the PLCs, so it can decompile the control
logic bytecode to a logical model. SABOT uses incremental
model checking to search for a mapping between a variables
within the control logic, and a specified physical device.
With this mapping, SABOT can compile a dynamic payload
customized for the physical device, and can upload it to
the victim PLC to manipulate the device. SABOT makes it
realistic to attack specific devices automatically without a pre-
compiled payload as in Stuxnet.
b) 2014-2016: Inspired by SABOT, a controller-aware
false data injection attack [110], CaFDI, was presented in
2014. CaFDI also assumes access to some high-level infor-
mation (i.e., the sensors/actuators connected to the PLCs).
CaFDI can work when access to the PLCs and HMI servers or
the privilege to upload malware to the PLCs are not granted.
CaFDI achieves this through manipulating some compromised
sensors within the substation. It first constructs a model
of the control logic program from its I/O traces, and then
searches for a set of inputs that may cause the model to
produce the desired malicious behavior. CaFDI calculates the
Cartesian product of the safe model and the unsafe model, and
recursively search for a path that satisfies the unsafe model in
the formalization. To stay stealthy, CaFDI avoids noticeable
Boolean input, e.g. a LED indicator. Motivated by the I/O
manipulations of CaFDI, Abbasi [32] leveraged the lack of
hardware interrupts to the pins, and proposed configuration
manipulation attacks and control-flow attacks by exploiting
certain pin control operations. Xiao [136] further fine tuned
the attacks to evade existing sequence-based fault detection
[96]. An attacker could first construct a discrete event model
from the collected fault-free I/O traces using non-deterministic
autonomous automation with output (NDAAO), then build
a word set of NDAAO sequences, and finally search for
the undetectable false sequences from the word set to inject
into the compromised sensors. These works make it practical
to inject malicious payload either through a compromised
SCADA network or insecure sensor configurations. It remains
challenging to eliminate the dependency on the accurate
knowledge of the plant to be successful. It is also challenging
to build a search engine that can efficiently explore the space
for stealthy malicious payloads, and skip unnecessary input
vector trials.
In 2015, Klick [97] presented a tool, PLCInject, with the
goal to spread control logic modifications to the network
of multiple internet-facing PLCs. PLCInject targets Siemens
Simatic PLCs that use the first Organization Block (OB) as
the initialization of the system. Through patching this OB,
PLCInject can further inject its scanner and proxy. Since
Simatic PLCs have UDP based Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) enabled by default, the scanner uses SNMP
to read the sysDesc object. PLCInject implements a SOCKS
5 proxy in a control logic because it is lightweight and can be
supported by all applications. Using the same communication
features, Spenneberg [131] implemented a worm, PLC-Blaster,
that can spread among the PLCs. The worm spreads by
replicating itself and modifying the target PLCs to execute the
worm in addition to the already installed user programs. PLC-
Blaster is advanced in some anti-detection mechanisms: 1) it
uses the anti-replay byte in S7CommPlus protocol to avoid
detection, 2) it interrupts execution every few milliseconds
to meet the maximum cycle limit and continues during the
next cycle, and 3) it stores at a less used OB to prevent
overwriting so as to survive restart. PLCInject and PLC-
Blaster successfully demonstrate the scalability of control
logic modification attacks.
With all the aforementioned tools available, in recent years,
attackers aim to counter against human operators at the engi-
neering station, with more sophisticated attacks.
c) 2017-2018: Garcia [71] developed HARVEY, a PLC
rootkit at the firmware level that can evade operators viewing
the HMI. HARVEY assumes access to the PLC firmware.
Compared to the control logic, firmware is less monitored
by the operators. Firmware allows interchanging of updated
values to and from the LED display on the device, and the
HMI. HARVEY fakes sensor input to the control logic to
generate adversarial commands, while simulates the legitimate
control commands that an operator would expect to see. In
this way, HARVEY can maximize the damage to the physical
power equipment and cause large-scale failures, without the
notice of the operators. Ladder logic bombs (LLB), presented
by Govil et.al [79], also manipulates sensor readings while
attempts to hide from manual inspection of the control logic.
LLB is achieved through invoking subroutines, naming an
instruction similar to a commonly used one, and storing
information on a SD card. It is the first to make the attacks
compatible to IEC-61131 defined languages. To make the
attacks more impactful, Lim [102] demonstrated common-
mode failure attacks targeting an industrial-grade (Tricon)
Triple-Modular-Redundant PLC that consists of redundant
modules for recovery purpose. These modules are commonly
used in nuclear power plant settings. Lim used DLL hijacking
to intercept and modify the command-37 packets sent between
the engineering station and the PLC, and could cause all the
modules to fail.
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Besides hiding from engineering operators, research works
also presented denial of engineering operation attacks [130].
Attackers could interfere with engineering operations aimed
at updating control logic programs, in response to changing
requirements. Attackers can manipulate the control logic so
that the engineering station cannot process it while the pro-
gram continues to execute. The goal is to seek cover for actual
attacks while the operators try to understand the problem.
d) 2019: To further deceive the engineering operators,
Kalle [91] presented CLIK, in 2019. CLIK employs a virtual
PLC at the network level to provide a full chain of attacks
by exploiting existing and zero-day vulnerabilities, e.g. in
the password authentication mechanism, in the PLCs. CLIK
modifies the control logic running in a remote target without
access to an engineering station nor the PLCs. It can also hide
the malicious modifications by providing a captured network
traffic of the original (uninfected) control logic. CLIK is more
realistic as a remote attack to disrupt physical processes,
compared with existing work.
In addition, a recent work presented a reverse engineer-
ing attack, ICSREF [93], which can automatically generate
malicious payloads, against CODESYS-based control logic.
ICSREF operates directly on the native binary, and unlike
SABOT [109], it does not require prior knowledge of the ICS.
To make the modifications even more stealthy, Yoo presented
stealthy transmission of control logic code [139] that can evade
from a bump-in-the-wire formal verification. These attacks
transfer control logic code as data, then split the data into
small fragments (one-byte per packet), and further pad the
fragment with large amount of noise data. Formal verification
will fail when it cannot even detect the existence of control
logic code.
4) Industrial sectors: We found only two papers explicitly
mention the applicable industrial sectors for their proposed
attacks. McLaughlin [111] designed the attack for railway
interlocking system, and Harvey [71] evaluated the attack in
a power grid test environment. Within each industrial sector,
the layouts of the physical processes are similar [109]. For
example, the plant contains two ingredient valves and one
drain valve, or when the start button is pressed the valve for
ingredient A opens. Such information are accessible in reality
and can be used by attackers as prior knowledge to design
domain-specific attacks.
The rest of the papers focus on certain products, with the
goal to attack control systems among various industrial sectors.
The two commonly tested products are Siemens Simatic S7
[38], [131] and Allen Bradley ControlLogix/CompactLogix
[71], [79], [128]. These products are widely used in the
industry, and offer advanced built-in features exposed with
multiple vulnerabilities.
5) Open challenges: The aforementioned attacks pose open
problems for security research.
a) Evasive attacks from PLC firmware: PLC firmware
provides important interfaces between the control logic and the
hardware, e.g. Ethernet module, web services, and is usually
considered as secure because of authentication and boot-time
and runtime integrity check. However, with a Joint Test Action
Group (JTAG) connection to the CompactLogix PLC and re-
calculation of the checksum, firmware can be hijacked without
being noticed [71]. Through firmware hijacking, control logic
modifications can evade from detection.
b) Expanded attack surfaces from engineering worksta-
tions: With the increasing popularity of DCS, recent research
in control logic modification attacks focuses on manipulate
engineering operations. Through manipulating control com-
mands sending between the engineering station and the PLC,
attackers can generate dynamic and targeted payload to modify
control logic programs [71]. These attacks can spread as
worms to cause large scale impactful failure [97], and can
evade detection of human operators [79]. Given that more
vulnerabilities for DCS were reported recently [12], [27],
future attacks using engineering workstations can be more
complicated.
c) Implicit or incomplete specifications: Research works
have shown crafted attacks using the implicit properties [109]–
[111]. The difficulties of defining precise and complete speci-
fications lie in that (1) product requirements may change over
time thus require update of semantics on inputs and outputs,
(2) limited expressiveness can lead to incompleteness while
over expressiveness may lead to implicitness, and (3) domain-
specific knowledge is usually needed Existing works have
investigated automatic specification generation, e.g. PLCspecif
[62], to satisfy general security requirements. However, it is
still challenging to meet domain specific requirements.
d) Confidentiality and integrity of control logic input:
We found multiple works leveraging control logic inputs to
perform attacks. Attackers use the input information for two
things: (1) monitor the input and extract high-level layout
information of the physical processes [109], [110], (2) manip-
ulate the input to some crafted values to deceive the program
to produce dangerous output [32], [79]. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no product protecting the confidentiality
and integrity of control logic inputs.
e) Stealthiness detection: Attacks can be stealthy in
several ways. To evade from deep packet inspection, attackers
can perform code obfuscation [80], or hide the code in a packet
through fragmentation and noise padding. Such a packet
contains a small size of a code fragment with substantial
padding of noises [139]. Attackers can also place code in data
block, given that many PLCs do not enforce data execution
prevention [139]. Formal verification fails when it cannot even
detect the existence of control logic code.
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION BASED DEFENSES
A. Industrial Efforts
Industrial efforts on formal verification mainly come from
(1) standards that provide definitions and guidelines for best
practices, and (2) products from different vendors conforming
to these standards, or explicitly include formal verification as
a built-in security feature.
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1) Stage: At the control logic programming stage, IEC-
61131 defines programming languages that are widely adopted
or referenced by PLC vendors. IEC-61499 extends IEC-61131
by adding events as inputs, and supporting function blocks to
interact with other controllers within DCS. These definitions
facilitate formal verification of control logic code. At the
transmitting stage, and during runtime communication, NIST
SP 800-82 [16] provides with an overview of the typical sys-
tem topology, threats and vulnerabilities, and general guidance
on securing PLC, DCS, SCADA, and other control system
configurations. At the execution stage, IEC-62443-3 defines
formal specifications for system diagnosis, e.g. the exchange
and processing of diagnostic information and the control of
diagnostic processes.
2) Assumptions: The standards assume that (1) they should
be general and applicable to broad areas, (2) they could
motivate vendors to conform to them, and (3) the price is
affordable by different types of businesses. Vendors assume
that standards-compliance indicates secure systems [2], [107].
3) Approaches: Formal verification is achieved through
using publicly free software, or purchasing proprietary soft-
ware, or independent research and development. ITTECH
provides paid proprietary software, Logic Error Hunter [22],
for automated verification of PLC control logic to achieve
reliability and functional safety, in the development stage.
PLCverif [55] and Arcade.PLC [122] also provide formal
verification of control logic code. They are originally from
research projects, and are now open and free to industrial
control logic programs.
In addition to the off-the-shelf formal verification tools,
some standards provide formal definition for DCS or general
distributed systems. IEC-18384 defines a formal ontology for
service-oriented architecture (SOA) for cloud computing and
distributed platforms. IEC-61588 defines a protocol for DCS
with precise synchronization of clocks in the measurement
and the control system. IEC-24707 defines a framework for a
family of logic languages using formal interpretations of the
symbols, allowing disparate computer systems to interchange
information using first-order logic-based systems. ISO-8807
defines LOTOS, a formal description on the temporal ordering
of observational behavior. In a broad range of applicable areas,
IEC-15909 defines a Petri net modeling language, and IEC-
13568 defines Z formal specification notation.
4) Industrial sectors: Each industrial sector has specific
standards providing safety and security requirements. Such
requirements lead to the rules in a specification. For instance,
the medical industry uses IEC-60601, the nuclear industry uses
IEC-61513, the avionics industry uses DO-254 and DO-178,
and the automotive industry uses ISO-26262 [81].
Besides the standards, industry-specific regulations may
limit the type of information that can be used by formal
verification. For instance, in medical industry, the security
rules of HIPPA regulation protect specific health information
that is held or transferred in electronic form [31], e.g. from
PLC to SCADA.
5) Open challenges: Formal verification of control logic
has to satisfy many requirements, from the general security
standards, industrial sector specific standards, and the regula-
tions.
• The standards may not be entirely complete, and new
versions may add more specifications. Given that IEC-
62443 has a total length of more than 800 pages already,
it is difficult for products to efficiently comply to the
standards.
• The price may not be affordable by small businesses.
• The performance and efficiency of conforming to the
standards are usually not addressed.
• Industrial sector specific regulations can limit the infor-
mation for formal verification to use, and the place formal
verification can happen.
B. Research Efforts
1) Stage: Existing works focus on control logic program-
ming stage [37], [39], [56], [75], [112], [114], [117], [133],
[143], [145], aiming to detect malicious code, and conform
to safety and functionality requirements. The interests of for-
mal verification span from different programming languages,
specifications, and verification frameworks, evolving with the
technology, standards, and requirements. Fewer works inves-
tigate code transmitting stage [67], or runtime execution stage
[88], [103].
2) Assumptions: These works usually assume that (1) the
behavior of control logic should satisfy general functionality
and security requirements of the ICS, (2) the behavior of
the physical processes should satisfy domain-specific and
manufacture-specific safety requirements, or (3) the commu-
nication between control logic and other components should
follow protocols correctly and securely.
Specifically, early works assume IEC-61131 defined lan-
guages, automating relatively simple operations [116], [117],
[125]. Later works assume IEC-61499 defined languages
with DCS [43], [48], [133], model-driven development [75],
timers [75], [134], [143], multitask control logic [115], and
incorporating machine learning [103]. More recent works
assume interactions and communications [47], [67], multi-
layer verification [114], complete verification frameworks [56],
[112], [145].
3) Approaches: The approaches detail the techniques, tools,
and platforms for formal verification of control logic in a
chronological order. Figure 4 shows the timeline of represen-
tative research.
a) 1992-1998: In 1992, Moon [117] presented the first
solution to applying formal verification on LD to automatically
test the safety and operability of an alarm acknowledge system.
This solution models each operation to be checked as an
“assertion“ in temporal logic and designs a model checker
to determine if the system model satisfies the assertions. For
example, whether the desired operating sequence of valves and
ignitors are satisfied. The checker provides an example for
each error violating the safety properties. This work assumes
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Fig. 4: The timeline of representative formal verification research.
a pure discrete system with all the operations happen sequen-
tially. In 1994, Moon [116] extended this work to multiple
alarm systems using relay ladder logic, and further analyzed
the performance, e.g. CPU time and memory size of the model
checker. Moon pointed out the needs for high-level language to
describe assertions, and model templates of timers, counters,
file handling, and etc.
Before 1999, formal verification of control logic programs
focused on IEC-61131 defined SFC and LD languages [100].
b) 1999-2005: In 1999, with the emergence of IEC-
61499, Vyatkin [133] provided preliminary guidelines on the
formalism of IEC-61499 defined function blocks in DCS.
Vyatkin expressed basic event operations of the function
blocks using Net Condition/Event systems (NCES), then de-
veloped formal rules to transform function blocks to NCES,
and finally implemented distributed algorithms to use these
function blocks. To formally verify sophisticated timed-NCES,
SESA was used. Vyatkin also outlined further steps towards
the full-scale verification of IEC-61499 applications.
Since then, IEC-61499 compliant engineering software had
emerged, including FBDK, CORFU, Torero and ISaGRAF
[48]. However, IEC-61499 only standardized the execution
model of a single function block, rather than function block
networks. This resulted in the same application, consisting of
multiple function blocks, to behave differently and harmful
potentially, when executing in two different IEC-61499 com-
pliant engineering software. To ensure deterministic behaviors
for distributed function blocks, Cengic [48] introduced Fuber
[48]. Fuber translates an IEC-61499 application to a set of
interacting state automata. The automata model synthesizes
function block scheduling, based on a given specification.
Fuber analyzes the behavior through supervisor verification
and synthesis tool Supremica.
c) 2006-2007: In 2006, model-driven software devel-
opment gained attention in ICS. First, security and safety
specifications are defined in object-oriented languages, e.g.
Java. Then, control logic code is automatically generated based
on a transformation. To formally verify the transformation,
Giese [75] leveraged triple graph grammars in the Fujaba
Tool Suite to specify the transformation from model to code,
and then used the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL to verify the
semantic equivalence between the given model and the code.
Giese tested the verification based on a specification from an
interlocking of railway transfer gate.
d) 2008: In 2008, to detect race conditions in real-
time systems, Bender [37] investigated model checking on
LD programs [37]. Race condition happens when the system
attempts to perform two or more operations at the same time.
This can cause security problems. In a LD program, race
condition reflects as when under fixed inputs and function
block states, one or more outputs keep changing values.
Bender first defined timed Petri net semantics for LD programs
through an ATL model transformation, and then generated
behavioral properties of the LD models using LTL formulae.
To detect race condition, Bender used Tina toolkit to check
the timed Petri net over the generated properties.
e) 2009: In 2009, formal modeling of timers became
pivotal in real-time systems. Given a sequence of stimuli to the
control logic, timers decide when to produce the outcomes.It
is difficult to verify timers because the input depends on its
output from previous cycles. Modeling timers as symbolic
function block calls, or separate timed automata, restricts the
uses to guard transitions, i.e. each step needs to be associated
with a timer [105]. Modeling timers as NCES can only support
to start at the beginning of the calculation phase [133]. Mod-
eling timers with theorem system Isabelle/HOL [75] assumes
the current value to increase monotonously without reset
actions in this process. Wan [134] presented a formalization
of Timers ON delay (TON) using the theorem proving system
in Coq. Coq is expressive to model TON-timers at different
abstract levels for different resolutions. Coq allows to reuse
specifications (not directed supported by model checking), and
prove parameterized properties. Wan tested the behavior of a
timed quiz machine, by describing the behavior of TON-timer
as a set of axioms, and assuming a function f to map the
start of each scan cycle to its time point. This method ensured
consistent execution time for each instruction, consistent TON-
timer values within one scan cycle, and avoided loops in one
scan cycle.
Mokadem extended formal verification of TON timers to
multitask control logic [115]. The multitask control logic is
part of the Mechatronic Standard System platform from Bosch
Group, consisting of a linear conveyor, and an event-driven
detector for the press-fit and present of material. The safety
properties depend on accurate reaction time, for example, the
conveyor must stop on its way out but not after unloading,
and the conveyor stops in less than 5 ms. Mokadem mod-
eled TON timers as network of timed automata, constrained
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with atomicity hypotheses concerning program execution. The
timed automata was first described in SFC and then translated
to LD. Mokadem used UPPAAL to check the reaction time
between the detection of a signal and the resulting event.
f) 2010-2011: In 2010, to achieve fault detection and
isolation in the physical processes, Luccarini [103] presented
a modular architecture using artificial neural networks to
aid formal verification of runtime control logic, in a waste
water treatment plant. Neural networks were used to extract
qualitative patterns from the continuous signals of the water,
e.g. pH, dissolved oxygen. These qualitative patterns were
then mapped to the control events in the physical processes.
Luccarini logged the mapping using XML format, translates
it into formal rules, and used SCIFF checker to validate the
processes against these rules. This work demonstrated the
feasibility of neural network aided formal verification for
runtime control logic execution.
g) 2012-2013: Before 2012, formal verification of con-
trol logic either required a transformation or was limited
to a subset of languages or language constructs [46], [78],
[117], [123], [125]. In 2012, Biallas implemented Arcade.PLC
[39], a verification platform independent from implementation
languages. Arcade.PLC translates different languages into an
intermediate representation, and provides a generic interface
for low-level analysis. It implements different orthogonal
approaches to account for the specific hardware platform and
its cyclic scanning mode. It supports static analysis, ∀CTL and
past-time LTL model checking, using counterexample-guided
abstraction refinement. Arcade.PLC can verify programs in-
volving complex control flow and heavy interaction with the
environment.
h) 2014-2015: In 2014, Mclaughlin [112] realized the
need of a minimal trusted computing base for the verification
of safety-critical control logic code. Mclaughlin designed and
implemented a bump-in-the-wire formal verification platform,
Trusted Safety Verifier (TSV), sitting between the PLC and the
engineering software. TSV is superior in that it can analyze
the binary directly without using source code, and handle
instruction set architectures from different vendors. Since
PLCs support features different from normal instruction sets,
Instruction List Intermediate Language (ILIL) was designed
for binary analysis. TSV first translates controller assembly
into ILIL, and then combines symbolic execution and model
checking to generate Temporal Execution Graphs (TEG) from
ILIL. Z3 theorem prover was used to check path feasibility
during symbolic execution, and simplified symbolic variable
values during TEG generation. TSV uses NuSMV for model
checking of the TEG, and verifies safety properties including
bounds on numerical device parameters, e.g., maximum drive
velocity and acceleration, and safety interlocks, to make sure
physically conflicting events do not occur. In the same year,
Zonouz [145] extended the work with a cyber-physical security
intrusion detection engine, which identifies malicious control
logic code injection.
In 2015, to simplify formal verification for users, including
model construction, model reduction and requirement formal-
ization, Darvas [56] designed and implemented PLCverif [56],
an open-source framework for control logic formal verifica-
tion. Before PLCverif, Arcade.PLC is the only publicly avail-
able tool, but only supports CTL or LTL defined requirements
for model checking. Initially, PLCverif supports the verifica-
tion of ST code, and can extend to other languages defined
in IEC-61131, with new model checkers. Later, re-engineered
PLCverif [55] further supported native STL code with formal
assertion violation checking, and integrated CBMC model
checker for C programs, and Theta framework for abstraction
refinement.
i) 2016-2017: In 2016, Mesli [114] first realized the
need of multi-layer formal verification of control logic. Mesli
proposed joint verification of supervision interfaces (e.g.,
HMI) and the controller ladder programs. In this work, all the
components along the control-command chain are modeled as
timed automata, and checked by UPPAAL with a set of safety
and usability properties written in CTL. An industrial case
showed that errors can be successfully detected in the control
programs and the supervision interfaces.
j) 2018: With the increasing need of runtime communi-
cation, formal verification of communication protocols became
critical. Fernandez [67] first proposed to formally verify the
execution of the High Integrity Operator Commands (HIOC)
protocol. This protocol dedicates to the communication be-
tween PLC and SCADA. Before that, formal verification con-
centrated on general communication protocols using ProVerif
[41], [124]. Fernandez verified each step of the HIOC protocol,
with the goal to ensure the critical commands sent from
SCADA are properly received by the PLCs, and the require-
ments of IEC-61508 are satisfied. HIOC was implemented in
SCL. Fernandez performed formal verification using PLCverif
[56], and found suspicious corner cases fail to match the
specification.
k) 2019: Zhang [143] presented VETPLC, the first so-
lution to verify timing-aware safety on runtime event-driven
control logic. Before VETPLC, research efforts on static code
verification failed to reveal runtime events, while dynamic
analyses and symbolic execution failed to handle timing
sensitive control logic. VETPLC combines static code and
runtime traces to verify safety properties. Zhang generated
Timed Event Causality Graphs (TECG) from the control
logic code, and mined temporal invariants from runtime data
traces to gauge temporal dependencies constrained by machine
operations. With the generated TECG, VETPLC performs
permutations to create timed event sequences, and applies to
execute the control logic. Based on the formalized specifica-
tions from domain experts, VETPLC performs runtime safety
vetting and finds hidden safety violations in two real-world
testbeds.
4) Industrial sectors: Multiple papers have investigated
domain-specific tasks and requirements. Some papers used
the same or similar verification techniques, but to overcome
the challenges in specification inconsistencies and availabil-
ity. Domain experts usually have less expertise in formal
verification, therefore it is challenging to generate accurate
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specification [94], [141]. Even through the specification is
accurate, sometimes only a certain format is available [119].
In nuclear industry, to bridge the gap between nuclear
engineers and formal verification experts, the Korean Nuclear
Instrumentation and Control System consortium (KNICS) de-
veloped a set of CASE tools [141], for easy verification of
FBD programs in nuclear reactor protection systems. CASE
integrates model checking and equivalence checking, to verify
the timing properties and regulation requirements. In 2017,
KNICS proposed Nuclear Development Environment (Nude)
2.0 for formal-method-based software development, verifica-
tion and safety analysis [94]. Nude 2.0 integrates twenty five
CASE tools, which can automatically develop FBD programs
from defined specifications, and ensure safety properties to be
equivalent to the original specification.
In 2018, the Darlington Nuclear Power Generating Station
requested a rigorous verification of the FBD control logic
automating the power generation [119] The quality assurance
program requires the specification to be written in tabular
expressions. Newell [119] presented a method to rigorously
translate FBD language to tabular expressions and prove with
a mathematical model in PVS theorem proving tool.
5) Open challenges:
a) Customized and inconsistent specification require-
ments: Requirement differences across industries and vendors
increase the effort of formal modeling, and limit scalability.
In water treatment area, the functional and safety properties
are highly distinct from the control tables specifying the
rules for the railway automation industry. Even within railway
automation industry, the rules are affected by local regulations.
This results in specifications to be expressed in different
types of languages using various domain expertise, making
it difficult for formal verification practitioners.
b) Lack of verified specification translator: In most of
safety-critical systems, e.g. nuclear systems, the software spec-
ification properties are first written in natural languages, and
then modeled with control logic languages such as FBD or LD.
PLC vendors provide tools to translate FBD/LD programs into
C programs and executable codes for specific PLCs. However,
the nuclear industry has not acknowledged empirically the
correctness and safety of a compiler that is capable to translate
FBD to C. Similarly, translation to an intermediate language
blurred the defined properties. Verification of property trans-
lators remains challenging.
c) Accurate and efficient abstraction: Model checking on
continuous features (e.g. time) is expensive, while reduction
and abstraction methods (e.g. Uppaal) can lose details of
the original code and are vulnerable to attacks. Choosing an
appropriate discrete abstraction for continuous behavior is still
an ad-hoc process. If the chosen abstraction is too coarse,
then the analysis may produce infeasible attack scenarios;
on the other hand, if the abstraction is unsound, then it
may fail to detect actual attacks on the system. Even though
researchers have been investigating the construction of suitable
abstractions, coming up with a “ground truth“ model for the
continuous behavior remains challenging.
d) Synchronization with evolved system design: Unsyn-
chronized execution can cause nondeterministic transitions
to malfunction or unsafe states. require each state transition
in the composite SMV model to accurately correspond to
one scan of the PLC program [125]. When interconnected
function blocks are executing in an event driven fashion,
synchronization extends to the combination of input and output
data and signals, and execution mode (e.g. enabled, disabled),
etc [43]. Since control logic interacts with other components,
synchronization between them is also needed. It is challenging
to ensure every state transition among all the components and
their functionalities, considering the latest PLC design.
e) Insufficient research on subroutine, interrupts, and
multitask: Very few works can support extensive instructions,
including time-related instructions, such as timer and counter,
and the subroutine and interruption instructions, in a multitask
fashion. Present solutions to support these features are target-
ing small and medium sized PLC programs. When the scale
and complexity increases, it becomes challenging to overcome
state explosion, without sacrificing accuracy or posing higher
demands on the hardware.
f) Runtime formal verification: The challenges include
(1) fault injection from the input sensors can only be detected
at runtime [110], (2) complex networking with expanded
attack landscapes, (3) real-time constraints, (4) synchroniza-
tion between control logic and other components [143], and
(5) limited resources are available on PLC, while powerful
supervisory components require secure communication.
g) Trend of cloud-hosted control logic management:
The rise of Industry 4.0 facilitates cloud-hosted control logic
management, which allows elastic functionality, scalability
and multi-tenancy. One application can be partially within
control logic, and partially in the cloud. For example, Beckhoff
PLCs proposed to integrate voice recognition skills using AWS
IoT [77]. Goldschmidt implemented a prototype for a cloud-
based software PLC serving as a Control-as-a-Service solution
[76]. Such applications will inevitably need control logic to
communicate using OPC, Web, SQL, and other services. The
confidentiality and integrity of control logic and input/output
information will entirely depend on the cloud. Existing re-
search on formal verification-based defenses is insufficient to
adapt to cloud-hosted control logic management.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
We have highlighted the security challenges in defending
control logic modification attacks, and formal verification-
based protection. Next, we offer recommendations to over-
come these challenges.
A. Vendors
We recommend vendors to prioritize security, and standard-
ize existing ad-hoc, vendor-specific implementations.
1) Development toolings: We recommend vendors to pri-
oritize security of the development toolings. Vulnerabilities
in these toolings [4] have invalidated user efforts in securing
programs. First, we recommend vendors to standardize the
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built-in features of the programming environments. Existing
vendor-specific features, such as simulation, virtualization, “all
inclusive”, tend to be ad-hoc, and pose challenges to build
effective formal verification solutions. Second, We recommend
vendors to provide development toolings that support code
formal verification as a default feature. This eases the work of
users to prevent common design flaws.
2) Code transmissions: We recommend vendors to pay
more attention to secure code transmission, since existing
works have shown multiple vulnerabilities and attacks mod-
ifying control logic in this stage. We recommend standard-
ization of protocols dedicated to code transmission, including
the commonly used Ethernet, RS-232, USB, etc. We also
recommend vendors to prepare for emerging internet-facing
code transmissions, with standardized security solutions to
defend against possible man-in-the-middle, denial-of-service,
and other stealthy modification attacks.
3) Runtime communication: We recommend vendors to
prioritize security during runtime communication. We recom-
mend vendors to adopt existing formal verification solutions,
to implement secure (1) PLC firmware, which embeds Web,
SQL, and other services, (2) supervisory components, which
send commands and exchange data with control logic, and (3)
real-time communication protocols, such as Modbus, Ether-
Cat, Profinet, etc. Some protocols are already standardized
by design, for example, EtherCat is standardized in IEC-
61158. However, different implementations, especially un-
trusted third-party implementations made them vulnerable. We
recommend standardized implementations to eliminate possi-
ble vulnerabilities resulting from uncertain implementations.
Faced with internet connected PLCs, we recommend vendors
to follow IIoT standards, such as Data Distribution Service
(DDS), and latest IIoT guidelines from industrial groups,
such as PLCOpen, OPC Foundation, OMAC. In addition, we
recommend open source implementation of the standards to
improve security.
B. Users
The users include control logic developers, and operators,
who are domain engineers, and formal verification experts,
who do not have sufficient domain knowledge.
1) Program design and implementation: We recommend
developers to program with standard languages, e.g. IEC-
61131 or IEC-61499 defined, so that abundant formal veri-
fication solutions will be available. We also recommend to
avoid using third-party ad-hoc development toolings, which
have led to multiple control logic modification attacks. We
also recommend control logic developers to explicitly spec-
ify parameters during programming, since multiple reported
vulnerabilities are due to unspecified system parameters [26],
unspecified/unverified length of parameters [14], and other
unspecified vectors.
2) Adopting formal verification: We recommend control
logic developers to adopt formal verification, such as PLCverif
[55], Arcade.PLC [39], ITTECH [22], and etc [122]. These
solutions are dedicated to control logic, and have demonstrated
to have enhanced code quality [54], [121]. We recommend
operators to adopt protocol-specific formal verification, such
as Fernandez’s work on IEC-61508 satisfied HIOC communi-
cation protocol, the AVANTSSAR validation platform [3], [34]
aims at large-scale Internet security-sensitive protocols and
applications, and other solutions [124] based on ProVerif [41].
We recommend formal verification experts to explicitly specify
properties in the specification, and check equivalence between
the specification and its previous versions or legacy code.
We also recommend formal verification experts to leverage
existing well-defined models, and conform to domain-specific
specifications, as described in Section IV-A
3) Developing bump-in-the-wire solutions: We recommend
users to reduce dependency on vendors in securing code
transmission. Specifically, we recommend users to develop
own bump-in-the-wire solutions, which sit between the system
operators and the PLCs [112], and are independent from the
supervisory software and hardware. We recommend users to
integrate formal verification to these solutions, by intercepting
every piece of transmitted control logic code and checking
with pre-defined security properties.
4) Leveraging embedded hypervisors for runtime verifi-
cation: Within the PLC, only limited memory is available
for runtime formal verification. On a SCADA, memory is
abundant, but runtime data traces have to transfer on a possibly
insecure network. We recommend users to leverage PLC-
embedded hypervisors or coprocessors to perform runtime
formal verification. Such embedded hypervisors should have
shared memory with a PLC, allowing programming blocks to
be integrated synchronously or asynchronously, and enabling
direct memory access to the inputs and outputs of the PLC
[44], [74]. We recommend users to carefully control mem-
ory accesses, and dedicate this hypervisor to runtime formal
verification.
C. Security Researchers
Next, we provide recommendations for future research
directions. In general, we highlight the need of a full-chain
protection of control logic.
1) Programming and specification: Based on the fact that,
at the programming stage, extensive research on formal verifi-
cation has been performed, and made fruitful progress, we
recommend future research to focus on open subdivision.
Specifically, we recommend the investigation of an intermedi-
ate representation based on mixed programming languages,
such as a function written in IL calling an ST function
[59]. The intermediate representation should minimize the
loss of useful information, while consider heuristics with the
increase of program sizes. We recommend the investigation
of formally verified specification translators. Such translators
should generalize the requirements from various domains,
and support incremental model checking based on domain-
specific requirements. We also recommend the investigation
of eliminating implicit properties. This should be based on
explicit-state model checking that maintains all state transi-
tions. To minimize the search space, researchers should con-
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sider context-bounded model checking, which uses abstraction
techniques and partial-order reduction algorithms [53], [86].
2) Multitask control logic: The structure of multitask con-
trol logic are temporal parallelism and spatial parallelism,
based on the hardware characteristics. For temporal paralleled
multitask control logic, we recommend researchers to extend
investigation on formal verification of TON timers. We hope
future research to relax the following assumptions: (1) timer
values will increase monotonously without reset actions, (2)
executions of the same instruction take the same time, and (3)
within each scan cycle, the values of a TON-timer used by
several instructions are the same. For spatial paralleled multi-
task control logic, formal verification is a new and challenging
research area. We recommend researchers to investigate formal
verification solutions considering task priority and execution
interval [73].
3) Detecting stealthy code transmission: Stealthy attacks
have shown to hide control logic code during transmission,
making bump-in-the-wire solutions, such as TSV [112], fail
to detect the existence of code [139]. We suggest secu-
rity researchers to investigate protocol-specific DPI to detect
such stealthy attacks. For commonly used code transmission
protocols, researchers should inspect the protocol structure,
the sequence of packets, and the expected byte values. Re-
searchers should investigate existing machine learning based
de-obfuscation techniques. For example, training SVM algo-
rithms to understand the semantics of packets, and further
predict the layout of the code [140].
4) Firmware formal verification: Malicious firmware has
demonstrated to modify control logic during runtime. We
recommend security researchers to investigate firmware ver-
ification before and after execution. This will need the PLC
to co-locate with a trusted resource abundant component (e.g.
SCADA, embedded hypervisor, etc). First, firmware uploads
to a PLC should be captured and formally verified against a
known benign version of the firmware executable. After the
firmware is loaded, the resource powerful component should
monitor its runtime behavior, including I/O access patterns,
and network access patterns. These runtime behaviors should
further be analyzed, based on pre-defined formal models, to
detect possible violation of security properties [113], [138].
5) Control logic synchronization: Attacks have shown to
leverage unsynchronized execution to modify control logic,
while bypassing formally defined properties [47]. We rec-
ommend security researchers to investigate synchronization
as a separate problem, and build formal models to represent
expanded interacting components and services. For example,
researchers should consider synchronizing the combination
of input and output data and signals, execution mode, with
interconnected control logic, in an event driven fashion. Re-
searchers should also consider runtime communication with
SCADA or DCS. We recommend modeling synchronization
properties as server/client states, to efficiently represent all the
components and alleviate state explosion problem [51].
6) Input confidentiality and integrity: Advance in IIoT
enables cloud-hosted SCADA and DCS to monitor control
logic, and store the monitored input and output data in the
(potentially insecure) cloud. Attacks have shown to use the
data either to acquire the high-level layout information of the
ICS, or to craft special payload to bypass formal verification
[109], [110]. We recommend security researchers to ensure
data confidentiality and integrity, through investigation of
SGX-enabled SCADA/DCS [49]. Specifically, we recommend
researchers to consider assigning a secure enclave for every
input source, e.g. a sensor, an actuator, to prevent data leak-
age or pollution due to a hijacked malicious sensor. In the
meantime, a formal verification framework should be able to
access the input data from all the sources, and prevent side-
channel attacks through profiling memory reads and writes.
We also recommend researchers to consider multitask control
logic in this scenario, and investigate whether the performance
overhead could satisfy the time constraints of a scan cycle.
7) Incorporating machine learning for runtime verification:
Formal verification on runtime control logic is insufficiently
researched. The major difficulty is specification generation
and maintenance, given the expanded control logic interac-
tions, with a complex networking. We recommend security
researchers to leverage the power of machine learning, and
investigate automatic specification generation, based on flexi-
ble threat models, and specification refinement with optimized
policies and parameters [63], [95]. Specifically, researchers
should first monitor legit runtime traces [52], [66], such as
time series based I/O and network accesses. Next, researchers
should perform legit trace mutation, to serve as counter
examples simulating malicious payload or stealthy traffic. The
mutation should consider state estimations to reduce the poten-
tial search space [73]. Later, researchers should train recurrent
neural networks, e.g. LSTM, using the time series data, and
generate specifications based on the neural networks. This
investigation will mitigate previous constraints from domain
expertise, and fast changing industry requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated control logic injection and modi-
fication attacks, and formal verification based defense solu-
tions among various industrial sectors. We found the attacks
are driven my emerging technologies with imperfect design,
for example, the inclusion of web services, SQL and email
services exposes control logic to broaden attack surfaces.
It will not be surprising to see such attacks in the near
future. We found formal verification has been used to defense
control logic since nearly thirty years ago, and is continuously
evolving with new technologies and industrial standards. Even
though such defenses have made progress in improving code
quality, we believe device/component-driven (e.g. PLC, HMI,
SCADA) protection is not enough. Control logic needs a full
chain of protection—from programming in the engineering
software, transmitting to a PLC, to executing in a PLC.
Formal methods alone, nevertheless, have seen challenges in
control logic communication and runtime verification, because
of the complex networking, and limited resources in the PLCs.
We therefore recommend best practices in leveraging formal
13
verification-based defenses to mitigate control logic attacks,
and urge future works to complement formal methods with
other defense technologies, e.g. neural networks, to fulfill a
full chain of protection.
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APPENDIX
A. Vulnerability Databases
This analysis is based on some interesting information, i.e.
the reported Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)s,
their corresponding Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)s,
the impacted vendors and industrial sectors, the complexity of
the CVEs, and their public exploits. We obtain the information
from several sources: the ICS-CERT [19], the National Vul-
nerability Database (NVD) [20], and the Exploit Database [21]
created by Offensive Security. The ICS-CERT reports timely
security issues and vulnerabilities specifically in the industrial
control systems. The NVD dataset contains general reports
from all types of vulnerabilities, without details of affected
industrial sectors and mitigation methods, as does by ICS-
CERT. Nevertheless, the NVD dataset is less likely to miss
data because of its popularity and has longer history (since
2002), while ICS-CERT provides data since 2010. The Exploit
Database is a CVE compliant archive of public exploits,
developed by penetration testers and vulnerability researchers.
B. Analysis Framework
We developed an analysis framework to first crawl and
download data from the above sources, then extract interesting
information on control logic related vulnerabilities, combine
the results from all the datasets, and finally generate statistical
reports from these information. The extraction combines fil-
tering notable PLC vendors [89], matching general keywords,
such as PLC, control logic, and combining specific keywords
such as HMI and remote code execution, meaning such vul-
nerability in the HMI can lead to control logic execution in
the PLC. The vulnerability may exist in the following places:
(1) PLC; (2) upper level components that affect running code
on the PLCs (e.g. HMI, SCADA, engineering station); (3)
the communication between a PLC and such components
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Fig. 5: The complexity of control logic related CVEs, depicted
with the mean and the standard deviation of CVSS scores.
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Fig. 6: Notable PLC vendors and number of related control
logic vulnerabilities reported per year.
or among PLCs. We randomly choose 100 CVEs from our
collected datasets. We manually label them as control logic
related or not, by going through the description of the vul-
nerability and checking online documentation of the affected
products. We consider these labels as the ground truth. Then
we run our automatic extraction framework and record control
logic related CVEs. By comparing this record and the ground
truth, we obtain the accuracy of our automatic extraction, with
false positive rate of 1% and false negative rate of 4%.
C. Analysis Result
Figure 5 shows the CVSS scores from both version 2 and
version 3. For these reported CVEs, we also analyzed the top
ten most affected vendors, as Figure 6 shows.
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TABLE II: Systematization of PLC formal verification research
Paper Venue Goal Formalization Methods Application Area
Moon’92 [117] AICE Model checking solution CTL Model Checker Chemical
Brinksma’00 [45] SPIN Non-real-time model checking SPIN, Promela Chemical
Bauer’04 [36] ISSTAE Model checking for timed and untimed SFC Cadence SMV, Uppaal Chemical
Rawlings’18 [126] JCCE Handle combined invariance and reachability symbolic model checking, Chemical
Rausch’98 [125] ACC Model checking solution SMV, Petri Net Manufacturing
Bonfe’03 [43] ICEFTA Compare IEC 61131 and IEC 61499 SMV Manufacturing
Cengic’06 [48] ICETFA Runtime environment for IEC 61499 Supremica (automata) Manufacturing
Carlsson’12 [47] TII Simulation-based model checking NuSMV Manufacturing
Yoo’09 [141] Software Model checking & equivalence checking NuSCR, Cadence SMV , VIS Nuclear
Darvas’15 [57] ICALEPCS Complete specification N/A Nuclear
Adiego’15 [33] TII General model checking nuXmv nuclear
Darvas’16 [60] IFM State reduction heuristics extended PLCverif Nuclear
Kim’17 [94] CSE Integrate tools [141] for Nude 2.0 25 Case tools Nuclear
Newell’18 [119] JAR Translate FBD for PVS proving PVS Theorem proving Nuclear
Luccarini’10 [103] EMS Analysis and validation on formal rules SCIFF checker Water treatment
He’16 [84] EIT Verify and assess non-timing properties Simulink PLC Coder Water treatment
Hailesellasie’18 [82] HSS Detect intrusion BIP, nuXmv, UPPAAL Water treatment
Pavlovic’10 [123] ICSTVV State reduction heuristic for FBD NuSMV Railway automation
Niang’17 [120] ICINCO Optimized safety verification Uppaal Railway automation
Fernandez’18 [67] ICALEPCS Comply IEC 61508 for critical PLCs PLCverif Railway automation
Chadwick’18 [50] ICIRT Safety verification for real systems Theorem Proving, First order logic Railway automation
Moon’94 [116] CSM Countermeasures for model checking temporal, assertions, LD Other mechatronics
Canet’00 [46] ICSMC Instruction list for model checking Cadence SMV Other mechatronics
Gourcuff’06 [78] DES State reduction heuristics NuSMV Other mechatronics
Giese’06 [75] MoDeVa Transformation verification GROOVE, ISABELLE/HOL, FUJABA Other mechatronics
Chang’06 [51] ICCIMCA Visualize model checking N/A Other mechatronics
Wan’09 [134] ACSAC Theorem proving for TON-timers N/A Other mechatronics
Zhou’09 [144] ACSAC Complete, compact and efficient translation M Uppaal Other mechatronics
Mokadem’10 [115] TASE Model checking for multitask PLCs Uppaal (timed automata) Other mechatronics
Biallas’12 [39] ASE Verification platform Arcade.PLC PLCopen Other mechatronics
Zonouz’14 [145] CRS,S&P Detect code injection symbolic execution SMT, TEG Other mechatronics
Mclaughlin’14 [112] NDSS Trusted safety verification platform TEG, symbolic execution Other Mechatronic
Mesli’16 [114] HMS Multiple layer verification Uppaal Other mechatronics
Darvas’17 [61] PPEECS ST to represent all languages PLCverif Other mechatronics
Kottler’17 [98] SoutheastCon Detect malfunctions by intruding NuSMV NuSMV Other mechatronics
Vyatkin’99 [133] ICETFA Verification for IEC 61499 Petri Net, CTL Generic
Rossi’00 [127] ICAM Model checking using LD Cadence SMV Generic
Bender‘08 [37] MDAFA Model checking to detect race condition Petri net (TPN), Tina tool Generic
Biha’11 [40] ACSAC Formal semantics for IL in Coq Coq with on-delay timers Generic
Wang’13 [135] ACSAC Formal semantics in BIP models BIP Generic
Kuzmin’13 [99] ACCS* Construct and verify PLC programs Cadence SMV Generic
Darvas’16 [59] PMS Generic model representation PLCverif Generic
Bohlender’18 [42] DES Mode abstraction for impact computation SMT Generic
Galvao’18 [70] HELIX Review of plant models in form verification N/A Generic
Luckeneder’18 [104] SAC Adaptive Cruise Control with model checking N/A Generic
Huang’19 [87] Access Formal semantics of ST applied in C, Java N/A Generic
Garcia’19 [72] ICCPS Translate DC code to PLC code and vice versa Theorem prover KeYmaera X Generic
Zhang’19 [143] S&P Automated safety vetting of PLC code BUILDTSEQS on TPTL Generic
Lamperiere’99 [100] ECC Survey SFC and LD validation N/A Survey
Frey’00 [69] ICSMC survey based on A-F-M N/A Survey
Mader’00 [106] DES Classification criteria of modelling N/A Survey
Younis’03 [142] CESA Survey formalization N/A Survey
Johnson’07 [90] CEP Survey formalization in software dependability N/A Survey
Ovatman’16 [121] SSM Survey model checking N/A Survey
Darvas’18 [58] ICALEPCS Survey challenges and solutions N/A N/A Survey
*Note: IT venues are labeled italic, IT OT hybrid venues, e.g. Automatic Control and Computer Sciences, are labeled italic*.
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Fig. 7: The type of CWEs and their corresponding number
reported per year.
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